Introduction
Considerable e ort has been expended over the last twenty-ve years or so in attempting to capture the exact meaning of the English progressive. We will argue below that, while a great deal of progress has been made, no-one has yet produced an adequate account. In this paper we will present an analysis which, we argue, remedies some of the de ciencies.
We will review some of the problems associated with pinning down exact truth conditions for progressive constructions. In particular, we will examine two recent accounts of the semantics of the progressive, those of Landman (1992) and Asher (1992) . We argue that while neither account is completely satisfactory, both contain important insights which can be combined and made more precise in the treatment we develop based on Barwise and Seligman's Channel Theory (Barwise and Seligman 1994) , a recent theory of information ow and reasoning with incomplete information. Our account is inspired in part by Hinrichs (1983) , who gave an analysis of the progressive in terms of situation theoretic constraints (a precursor to some of the notions of channel theory), and Cooper (1985) , who made further suggestions along these lines.
We will argue that the notions of natural regularity and channel embodied in channel theory provide exactly what is needed to give an account of the progressive which is precisely expressed and explains the data. In particular, we will show how natural regularities, while related to \defaults" as used, for example, by Asher, are di erent in some signi cant respects which allow us to account for some examples that are problematic for a default-based account.
We show how channel theory allows us to separate out the \existence" of a natural regularity from the way in which we may, under certain circumstances, reason on the basis of such a regularity.
We will show how our account can be successfully applied to a range of examples, many of which have proved problematic for earlier accounts, including those of Landman and Asher. It should be stressed that, while the intention is to introduce a new perspective (that of channel theory) to the analysis of the progressive, we do not claim that the present version of our account solves all the problems. More work is required in certain areas, including some basic issues of channel theory and its formalisation. However, we believe that the present account sheds some useful new light on some of the traditional problems, and o ers promise for a future account of increased precision.
Our account is a truth-conditional one, in that it sets out to de ne the precise conditions under which a progressive sentence can be truthfully used. In this respect it is similar to the accounts in (for example) (Dowty 1979) , (Landman 1992) and (Asher 1992) , while di ering from these accounts in other signi cant respects that will become clear shortly (we do not, for example, use possible worlds). Our account might also be be termed`compositional', in that, again like those of Dowty, Landman and Asher, the truth conditions of a progressive sentence are de ned in terms of the truth conditions of the corresponding non-progressive. 1 It will be noted, too, that we say very little in this paper about the \context change potential" of progressives, which is emphasised in accounts of the progressive in DRT (see (Kamp and Reyle 1993) ). This does not mean that we consider the e ect of a progressive sentence on the temporal structure of discourse to be unimportant. It is simply that one paper cannot do everything. The interested reader is referred to (Glasbey 1994a) , where the \stative" view of progressives proposed by (Vlach 1981) and employed by DRT accounts is criticised, and an alternative proposed.
A Brief History and Some Problems
An early truth-conditional account of the progressive was given by Bennett and Partee (1972) , using interval semantics. The idea was that a progressive sentence is true at a time interval t if t is part of a larger, later-ending interval t 0 at which the corresponding non-progressive sentence is true. The problem is that this predicts that a progressive sentence is only true if the corresponding non-progressive is also true. In other words, there is no allowance for interruptions. Yet it is clearly possible for the progressive of an accomplishment 2 to be true even if the complete event never occurs|this is the familiar \imperfective paradox". We can say, for example: (1) Mary was building a house but she ran out of money and had to stop.
That is, \Mary was building a house" can be true even though she never nished it. In order to get over this problem, Dowty (1979) used a possible worlds framework, employing the notion of inertia worlds. The non-progressive is no longer required to be true in the actual world, but it must be true at a larger interval in all the inertia worlds. The inertia worlds for an interval i and a world w are de ned as those worlds which are identical to w up to i, but in which from then on \nothing unexpected happens" and \events take their normal, natural course". It is not clear, however, what it means for events to take their normal, natural course. For example, it has been argued that in the example: (2) Mary was crossing the road when she was hit by a truck.
if events take their normal, natural course, then Mary will still be hit by the truck, because the truck will still be hurtling towards Mary in the inertia worlds. Landman discusses this objection, and suggests that a way round it is to require that in the inertia worlds the event of Mary crossing the road (but not necessarily everything else) takes its normal, natural course|that is, we are allowed to remove the truck from the inertia worlds. Landman also considers the problem of what happens if there is a second truck behind the rst one, also on course to hit Mary. In order to make the progressive true, we have to go to a world where neither truck is present. In other words, as Landman puts it we have to \remove all danger of the event being interrupted". We remove everything \external to the event" and see if this allows the complete event to be realised. If this is the case, then the progressive is true.
However, Landman (1992) points out that this proposal runs into problems with sentences like:
Mary was wiping out the Roman army.
This sentence is generally agreed to be unacceptable when used to describe a scenario where Mary, a normal human being with only conventional weapons at her disposal, has (for example) killed two Roman soldiers and is about to attack a third. The reason we judge such a progressive unacceptable seems to have to do with the fact that the project is absurd|Mary hasn't the remotest chance of achieving her objective. Yet, if we are allowed to remove anything \external to the event" which prevents the complete event from being realised, then we are presumably allowed to remove the whole of the Roman army, which would make (3) an acceptable way to describe the scenario.
Landman proposes a way to overcome this problem. The idea is that we follow the progress of an event e (corresponding to the complete event, as described by the non-progressive 
John is walking to the shops. Now suppose John habitually takes a walk from his house to the shops. A neighbour observes him daily, setting out and returning with his shopping. Suppose that on the way to the shops, there is a turning which leads to the park, and one ne morning John decides, as he sets out, to forgo his shopping and take a stroll in the park instead. John's neighbour, watching him set out, is of course unaware of the change of plan, and says to herself:
John is walking to the shops.
We would want to say that she is wrong|the progressive (5) does not correctly describe this scenario. But of course it's a reasonable option for John to walk to the shops after leaving his house|he does so every day. What is di erent today is John's intention, which is invisible to his neighbour. How does Landman's account rule out (5) in this case? Landman could point out 3 that his notion of reasonable option depends upon factors that are \internal to the event"|and it seems reasonable that such factors should include the agent's intentions in at least some cases. If we can argue that John's intention to go to the park is internal to the event, then we can say that on the basis of this intention it is not a reasonable option to go to a world where he doesn't turn o to the park, but goes to the shops.
Yet there are many cases where an agent cannot be said to have intentions, or where the intentions of the agent are simply not relevant. It appears that more work is needed on how to make the notion \internal to the event" precise.
There appear, too, to be examples where the notion \internal to the event" is problematic.
Consider the following: (6) For many billions of years, the universe was contracting back to a singularity. Then, in the last hour or so, the interactions between black holes prevented it from ever reaching that point, and it began to expand again.
According to Landman's account, the progressive \The universe was contracting back to a singularity" is acceptable provided that the complete event is a reasonable option on the basis of what is internal to the event. This forces us to regard the interactions between black holes as being external to the event, which seems rather counter-intuitive given that the contraction event involves the whole universe.
Progressives with contradictory outcomes
Landman admits that pairs of progressive like (7a) and (7b) are problematic for his account as it stands.
(7) a. We were ying to Manchester.
b. We were ying to Havana.
It appears that there are single scenarios which are correctly described by both (7a) and (7b). Suppose that we bought tickets to Manchester and got on the plane which took o and headed for that city. On the way a band of hijackers forced the pilot to take us instead to
Havana. In restrospect it seems quite possible to say:
We were ying to Manchester but some hijackers forced the pilot to take us to Havana.
and also to say:
We were, although we didn't know it at the time, ying to Havana.
This example is similar to the following one (attributed by Asher to Irene Heim) which, as
Asher and others point out, poses problems for Dowty's analysis.
(10) Irene was making sh stew but the cat was eating the sh.
Just as in (7), the two outcomes are mutually incompatible, so there are no worlds in which both events can be completed. Yet the sentence containing the two progressives is perfectly comprehensible. This is a problem for Landman as well as Dowty. Landman proposes extending his account to deal with this kind of example by incorporating some notion of perspective. Depending on the perspective of the speaker, one or other of the progressives may be true. However, he does not attempt to formalise this idea, and it seems that he would need to introduce a considerable amount of new machinery into his account in order to do so.
We will show below how channel theory provides us with the theoretical tools to make the notion of perspective precise. 4 Asher's Account Asher (1992) gives a semantics for the progressive which employs defeasible reasoning. Use of the progressive relies on the existence of a default to the e ect that, in the absence of any information to the contrary, we may conclude that the corresponding non-progressive sentence is true. If, however, there is information to the contrary, as is the case in:
(11) Mary was crossing the road when she was hit by a truck.
then the default is overridden by the more speci c information to the contrary, and we may not conclude that she crossed the road.
Asher uses a possible worlds semantics which makes no use of events or event types, and thus in order to capture what he calls the \relevant features" of the progressive state 5 that participate in the default, he introduces a theoretical notion of perspective 6 , which excludes those aspects of the state which are not considered relevant. Thus, which characteristics we can count or discount depends on the the perspective taken. This is Asher's way of removing \interruptions to the event"|we are allowed to take a perspective which excludes the interruptions. Exactly which perspectives are licensed at a particular point of the discourse is a matter that Asher does not make precise, and it appears that further work is required here. Rather than examine this matter in detail, we will concentrate on what appears to be a more serious problem.
There are some progressives where the default notion does not seem to be correct. One example, considered by Asher himself, is:
(12) Mary was crossing the mine eld.
Here, the problem is that the progressive is judged acceptable even though there appears to be no default that people crossing mine elds generally arrive at the other side. A more likely outcome (or, at least, an outcome that is equally likely) is that the person will be blown up en route. Now, a possible rejoinder is to say that special knowledge about Mary or the mine eld might allow us to use the progressive. If, for example, Mary is an expert in crossing mine elds and has suitable mine-detecting equipment, the default may well be that she gets safely across. Another possibility, raised by Asher, is that (12) may be used if Mary is unaware that it's a mine eld she's crossing. This might allow us, says Asher, to take a perspective, corresponding to Mary's viewpoint, which excludes the information that it is a mine eld.
However, it is possible to construct examples which pose problems for both these strategies.
Consider the following discourse:
(13) I looked out of the observation hut window and was horri ed at what I saw. Mary was crossing the mine eld. I realised, remembering her state of despair when she spoke to me the day before, that she was trying to get herself blown up.
In this scenario, Mary not only knows that it's a mine eld that she is crossing, but is exploiting that fact|she is deliberately trying to get herself killed. The narrator, too, is fully aware that what Mary is crossing is a mine eld. It is therefore extremely di cult to see how any perspective which left out the fact of the mine eld could be justi ed. In conclusion, we do not see how Asher's notion of default can account for this example.
Another similarly problematic example is:
John is writing a novel. He won't nish it, of course. Hardly anyone ever does.
A speaker uttering (14) feels able to describe what John is doing as`writing a novel', even though she clearly perceives no default to the e ect that people writing novels normally nish them. Indeed, her second and third sentences indicate that she believes that the default goes the other way and that people generally don't nish the novels they start. It does not seem possible to nd any other perspective here which might license the default, as this is simply a piece of directly reported speech. So we are left with the same kind of problem as in the mine eld example.
The mine eld example is also problematic for Landman. In the scenario described by (12),
Landman would need to explain the acceptability of the progressive by being able to move to successive closest possible worlds, removing \one mine at a time", just as in (3) we removed one Roman soldier at a time. Remember, though, that we can only remove another mine, at each step, if to do so is a reasonable option from the actual world w. Now we might well argue that there comes a point, long before Mary reaches the other side, at which it is no longer a reasonable option to remove any more mines. This is certainly the case if we expect
Mary not to get across, as in (12). So Landman is left without a way to explain why (12) is acceptable. The problem is that, while it does not seem to be a reasonable option for Mary to get across the mine eld, the progressive may still be correctly used to describe the scenario.
3 Towards an Improved Account Certainly, there seems to be something right about Asher's notion of defeasible reasoning. On many occasions it appears that we do infer from our knowledge of the \progressive event" that the event was completed, unless we know otherwise. And Landman's notion of \reasonable option" seems to go some way towards capturing the idea of \normality" that earlier accounts such as Dowty's set out to express but failed to do adequately. Our challenge is to combine the above insights by making the notion of \reasonable option" more precise and also to characterise how people (may) reason with the information content of progressive sentences.
In the remainder of the paper we will develop an account based on channel theory which attempts to do these things.
Suppose we say that by stating (12), the speaker is not making use of a speci c default about crossing mine elds in particular, but is making use of a more general default|perhaps one concerned with \crossing things" in general. Then, we might argue, it doesn't matter that there is no speci c default \available" for mine eld crossings. Certainly, it appears more psychologically plausible that we use general rather than speci c defaults|the load on memory would be very great otherwise. 7 Let us suppose for a moment that there is such a general \crossing" default|to the e ect that if someone (or something) is crossing something, then the default is that they get to the other side of it. We might express this provisionally as:
where`>' signi es non-monotonic entailment, as used by Asher, and`X crosses Y' corresponds to a complete crossing.
The notion of default we are using looks something like what Barwise and Seligman (1994) call a natural regularity. A natural regularity is a constraint which holds between types of things in the world|for example between the type of situation where my doorbell rings and the type of situation where someone is standing on my doorstep. If my doorbell rings, then I am generally safe in assuming that someone is standing on the doorstep. It is quite possible that there is another explanation|such as the doorbell being broken|but this is the exception rather than the rule. We appear to use such regularities much of the time to allow us to reason with the often incomplete information we receive about the world we live in. Natural regularities are both reliable and fallible. In general, they work well, which is why they are useful to us, but they also tolerate exceptions and thus our reasoning may fail to re ect reality on a particular occasion| I may go to the door to nd no-one standing there.
Channel theory is a mathematical theory of information ow based on the notion of natural regularity (see Barwise and Seligman 1994 , Barwise 1993 , Seligman and Barwise 1993 ). This notion is derived from the earlier situation-theoretic notion of a constraint|see (Barwise 1989 E ectively, the MNC ensures that a token is not the LHS of an exception unless information about it contradicts the \background assumptions" of the channel. In Cavedon's model, this background information is represented by means of a channel hierarchy. This is most easily explained using an example. Suppose we have a channel C which supports the constraint bird ! y, where bird is the property of being a bird and y is the property of being able to y. Now, suppose that b is a particular bird, and the (re exive) connection b 7 ! b is one of the tokens of C. If we have no further information about b, then the MNC allows us to assume that this connection is not an exception to the above regularity, i.e. that:
and thus we can infer from the soundness condition that b: y. Now, suppose that we know that b is a penguin. In this case, some means of blocking the above reasoning is required (because we know that penguins cannot y). One way to do this might be to change the constraint to:
A similar approach is taken by Barwise (1989) , who (in a treatment of conditionals) expresses this as:
where B is the property of not being a penguin. The property of not being a penguin is seen here as a \background condition" to the constraint bird ! y. A problem in this approach is that it may well not be possible to specify all the background conditions that are required in order for a given constraint to be applicable. By this method Cavedon obtains a logic for defeasible reasoning with channels, whereby \more speci c contrary information" can block the derivation of new channels by serial composition.
We will see shortly how a slight modi cation of our analysis of the progressive, combined with Cavedon's model of reasoning with channels, allows us to account for the \mine eld" examples, (13) and (14), that were problematic for Asher's analysis. First, however, we will show how the notion of \situation type" that we have been using to formulate some of our constraints can be made more precise using situation theory, and how we can build temporal information into the constraints.
Situation types and the part-of relation So far, we have not given an exact characterisation of \situation type". In order to do this, we need to introduce some apparatus from situation theory (for an introduction to situation theory see, for example, Barwise and Perry 1983 , Barwise 1989 , and Barwise and Cooper 1993 . First, however, let us consider how we might build some kind of temporal information into our account of the progressive. Bennett and Partee's original analysis, although incorrect in that it required a \completed event" (see Section 2), contained the important intuition that the \progressive event" occupies a time interval which is included in the time interval for the \completed event". Other more recent analyses of the progressive encode a similar notion of temporal inclusion. Smith (1991) , rejecting earlier analyses such as that of Vlach (1981) of the progressive as a \stativiser", presents an analysis whereby a progressive sentence is seen as conveying an \internal viewpoint" on the corresponding complete event. Here, the notion is one of event inclusion rather than temporal inclusion, but the idea is intuitively very similar. Viewpoint Aspect: This concerns the speaker's perspective on the situation described.
Viewpoint aspect acts as a kind of window on situation aspect, determining how much of the situation is \visible". Smith de nes three viewpoints|perfective, imperfective and neutral. Viewpoint aspect is independent of situation aspect, giving rise to the two-component nature of the theory. The essential properties of a particular situation aspect are not obscured by the viewpoint aspect imposed upon it, but continue to be visible. Perfective aspect presents an event in its entirety|\complete with both endpoints". Imperfective aspect, on the other hand, presents an \internal portion" of an event, without either of its endpoints.
In Smith's theory, progressives and statives are distinct. The English progressive is a manifestation of imperfective viewpoint, while \state" is a particular situation aspect. Smith circumvents the imperfective paradox, by not addressing the issue of what must be true about an eventuality for it to qualify as part of a bigger (conceptual) eventuality. We will address this further below.
Smith develops a DRT formalisation of her account of the progressive, which works as follows.
For a progressive sentence such as: e, x, y, I
x:Mary y:Ben Nevis e = climb(x,y) e = fAccomplishmentg viewpoint(I,e) = imperfective
There is a problem, however, concerning the interpretation of this DRS. We have an event referent e corresponding to the complete event, and yet of course it is not necessary that such a complete event exists in the model. In attempting to express her ideas in DRT, Smith has thrown away the highly intuitive notion that the complete event is of \conceptual" rather than \real" status. What is missing from her account is a notion of conceptual event or event type. Now channel theory, with its distinction between the token level and the type level, can provide us with what is required here. First, however, we need to see how we can represent an event such as \e = walk(x,y)" above in terms of situation types. 15 In order to do this, we use the version of situation theory given in (Barwise and Cooper 1993 
But this is only the case if the infon climb(X,Y,T) is related in a particular way to S.
Intuitively, we require that S is the \minimal situation" or \smallest situation" that supports the infon|that is, S corresponds to the climbing event and nothing more. 17 We can make this precise by ensuring that climb(X,Y,T) is a \key infon" of S. This notion is taken from (Cooper 1985) . A key infon of a situation S is de ned by Cooper as an infon whose temporal duration (corresponding to its time argument T) includes those of any other infons supported by S. If climb(X,Y,T) is indeed a key infon of S 18 , then we can say that T is the time role or run-time of S. More formally, we introduce a binary type TIME-OF which holds between a situation S and a time T if T is the run-time of S. That is, we write: 19 S,T TIME-OF Situation-theoretic objects may have restrictions imposed on them, as shown below, where the object P is restricted by the proposition Q. That is, the representation below denotes P i the proposition Q is true, otherwise it fails to denote.
P Q
The use of restrictions allows us to represent certain kinds of \backgrounded' or \presupposed" information such as the naming of individuals. Cooper (1993) 
TIME-OF
From a proposition such as the one above we can form a type by abstracting over one or more of the parameters, using the technique of simultaneous abstraction developed in (Aczel and Lunnon 1991) and (Lunnon 1991) . For instance, we can abstract over S in the above proposition to give the situation type: Situation theory thus allows us to make precise the notion of situation type or event type, and, moreover, allows us to speak of the realisation or instantiation of such types. We can represent an event of conceptual status as an event (situation) type, without necessarily claiming that the type is realised as an actual event. This allows us to think of the speaker referring to an event type, and claiming only that an internal portion of that event type is instantiated. For example, we might say that an utterance of: (17) Mary was climbing Ben Nevis. describes a situation s, where s : and is an \internal portion" of an event of type , being the type of the complete event, which is the type shown above.
Smith admits that her account is not a truth-conditional one, in that it does not attempt to cover the \normality" component of the progressive. We can remedy this by adding the semantics for the progressive we developed above, which requires that some channel C supports the constraint ! (see below).
Next, we need to make precise the notion of \internal portion". We want to say that, in those cases where the complete event is realised (that is, there is an s . In order to formalise \is an internal portion of" we use the notion of part-of (or ) from situation theory. This is de ned in (Barwise 1989) as follows: For all situations s 1 ; s 2 , s 2 s 1 i any infon supported by s 2 is also supported by s 1 .
Based on this, we can de ne a new relation temporal part-of ( t ) which requires also that the run-time of s 2 is temporally included in the runtime of s 1 .
Adding this requirement gives us the following semantics for the progressive:
If an utterance of a sentence of the form X was V-ing Y' can be correctly used to describe a situation s, this shows that:
There is a channel C : A ) B and a type such that s : in A, and ! is supported by C (where is the type of the corresponding \complete event"`X V-ed Y'), and Our semantics for the progressive now incorporates two notions: rstly the idea that some channel must support an appropriate constraint between the type of situation described and the complete event, and secondly that, in those cases where the event goes to completion, the described event (\progressive event") is part-of, in the sense de ned above, the complete event.
However, our task is not yet complete. We will see below that some further re nement is needed.
Some Examples and Some Complications
Let us now test our account on some further examples. We discussed above how we can capture the semantics of: (18) Mary was climbing Ben Nevis.
To summarise brie y, we say that there is a channel C which contains a number of connections between situations. In addition, C supports the constraint ! , where is a situation type corresponding to an incomplete crossing, and a situation type corresponding to a completed crossing. We proposed that if the described situation s is of type , then s may be described using the appropriate progressive (`X was crossing Y'). (20) . We want to keep the general swimming constraint (which we will abbreviate to`gsc'), but to rule out the use of the progressive in a case where the subject is Mary and the object is the Atlantic. Note that this is not the same thing as saying that a particular connection between situations is not classi ed as being of the type of the constraint. This would only tell us that the complete event was not realised|it would not rule out the use of the progressive per se.
We propose the following explanation. Let us suppose that there exist (in the sense that human beings perceive them and use them to reason with) channels supporting constraints at a fairly general level, that we might informally call crossing constraints, swimming constraints, etc. We do not want to commit ourselves at this stage to saying exactly what constraints we use, or at what level of generality we perceive them. Much further work would be required in order to establish this, possibly lying outside the realm of linguistic semantics. We will merely explore here the idea that constraints may exist at di erent levels of generality.
Imagine someone hearing a progressive like (20). In order to make sense of it, the hearer starts with the general swimming constraint (gsc), which we will call ! , being the situation where the hearer may readily substitute`Mary' and`the road' in the RHS type of the general crossing constraint (gcc), to give the situation type corresponding to a complete event \Mary crossed the road". Now, this situation type is seen as conceivably possible, and the progressive is therefore licensed.
The impossibility of the \instantiation" in (19) and (20) is thus responsible for the fact that these are judged as unacceptable progressives. Of course, if the hearer believes that Mary is superhuman, or receives divine assistance, then the instantiation may become possible, thus allowing her to accept the progressive. This allows us to account for the so-called`miracle scenarios' discussed by Landman. Now, what about Mary crossing her mine eld? Can we explain why:
(22) Mary was crossing the mine eld.
is acceptable? Once again, the hearer starts with the gcc, ! . Now she tries to instantiate by substituting`Mary' for X and`the mine eld' for Y. Doing so produces the situation type corresponding to a complete crossing of the mine eld by Mary. As long as we can see this situation type as \conceivably possible", we may use the progressive. We do not require the complete event to be the default outcome, nor even that it is likely or expected, but simply that it is (in the mind of the hearer) a possible outcome. Provided that the hearer believes it is possible for Mary to get to the other side of the mine eld, it is correct for her to use the progressive. This is the case even though the hearer may believe that by far the most likely outcome is for Mary to get blown up. On Cavedon's model of reasoning with channels, discussed above, we say that the channel C supporting the gcc is a sub-channel of a channel Thus, there is no \default" to the e ect that someone crossing a mine eld succeeds in getting to the other side. Nevertheless, the use of the progressive in (22) is licensed, by virtue of the existence of the channel C supporting the gcc, and by the fact that getting across a mine eld is seen as conceivably possible.
Similarly, consider:
(23) John was writing a novel.
Here, the use the progressive is licensed by virtue of a channel supporting what we can call a \general writing constraint", which tells us that if someone is writing something they generally nish it (with the added proviso, once again, that we can see the situation type corresponding to a complete writing of a novel by John as conceivably possible). Once again, there does not need to be a default to the e ect that if John (or anyone else) is writing a novel he (or she) will nish it.
We can therefore explain why most speakers are happy to accept (22) and (23) to describe the appropriate scenarios, while rejecting (20). We di er from Asher in that we do not require there to be a default that someone crossing a mine eld succeeds in getting to the other side, or that someone writing a novel completes it. It is the fact that some channel supports the appropriate general constraint (e.g. the gcc)|together with the \conceivably possible" requirement|that licenses the progressive.
Our account di ers from Landman's, too, in that we do not require Mary's getting to the other side of the mine eld to be a \reasonable outcome", but simply possible. 21 Our proposal can be summarized as follows. Correct use of the progressive is licensed by the fact that some channel C supports a general constraint of the appropriate kind (such as the gcc or gsc). We also require that the consequent (RHS) type of the constraint can be instantiated (by the particular referents supplied by the utterance) to give a situation type that is \conceivably possible". The latter requirement rules out examples like (19) and (20).
However, the fact that the progressive is licensed in (22) We can now give a revised semantics for the progressive, taking the above modi cations into account.
If an utterance of a sentence sent of the form X was V-ing Y' can be correctly used to describe a situation s, this shows that:
There is a channel C : A ) B and a type such that s : in A, and ! is supported by C, 
Some Further Examples
In this section we will look brie y at some further examples which are problematic for Landman, Asher, or both, and show how the channel theoretic account can help us to address the problems.
Perspectives revisited
Earlier, we discussed examples like:
We were ying to Manchester / We were ying to Havana.
We will now see how the notion of channel allows us to deal with such examples. We have seen that a channel C contains a number of connections, supports one or more constraints, and classi es which connections are of which types. Thus a channel may be thought of as a perspective|one particular way of classifying reality. Alternative ways of classifying reality are possible, and we may think of these as corresponding to di erent channels. We may want to associate di erent channels with di erent participants in an event, or even with the same participant, re ecting the fact that it is possible to switch viewpoint mid-sentence. The example below should make this clear. in which case we y to Havana. Of course, it is not possible for both of these to be true on the same occasion. And it is not necessary, of course, that either of them are true|we may not reach either destination. As we have seen, all that is required to license the use of the progressive is for the described situation to be of the type of the antecedent of the constraint (together with the \conceivably possible" requirement).
Thus each \perspective", in the informal sense used by Landman, can be seen to correspond to a distinct channel in our framework. The di erent channels correspond to alternative perspectives that may be taken by the speaker depending on her knowledge or point of view at the time of evaluation. Or, as we suggested above, the di erent channels may in some cases correspond to points of view taken by di erent participants in the event. Consider the example given earlier:
(25) Irene was making sh stew but the cat was eating the sh.
Here, we can view the channel C 1 , corresponding to the rst progressive, as re ecting the perspective of Irene (given her intention to make the stew) and the channel C 2 , corresponding to the second progressive, as re ecting the perspective of the cat (given its intention to eat the sh). Either outcome (or neither) may be realised, but it is not possible for both events to be completed. Thus we can deal with examples of \con icting" progressive which are problematic for Dowty, and for Landman's basic account. 22
Intentions
Let us now investigate brie y how the channels proposal would work in examples where intentions are important, such as: (26) John was walking to the shops.
In Section 2, we described a scenario where this progressive is not licensed, because John's intentions are inappropriate. First, let us suppose that there is a general \walking-to" con-straint ! , where is the type of situation \X walks to Y". In order to capture the requirement that John's intentions must be right, we must build information about the intentions of X into . Thus a situation s will only be of type if s supports the information that John intends to walk to the place in question. 23 This prevents a situation where John intends to walk to the park rather than to the shops from being classi ed as of type , and hence the progressive cannot be licensed.
In contrast, we have examples like:
(27) Mary was making John a millionaire.
where the progressive may be true even when the agent does not intend the outcome to happen. In this case, suppose we have a general constraint ! , where is`X makes Y a millionaire'. In this case we do not need to place any restrictions on concerning the intentions of X. 24
Thus, by taking care to de ne precisely the situation types which make up the antecedents of our constraints, we can build in information regarding the intentions of the agent in cases where this is relevant, and exclude it where it is not. 25
Drinking bouts and paper marking Finally, let us look brie y at some examples that Ogihara (1990) identi ed as problematic for analyses of the progressive, and which Asher confesses are problematic for his account. These include:
(28) Mary is marking 50 exam papers.
which is acceptable when used to describe a situation where Mary has marked, say, eleven papers and is taking lunch before starting work on the twelfth.
Compare, however:
(29) ??Mary is drinking three cups of tea and ve glasses of whisky.
which sounds distinctly odd, even if I say it in the middle of a day when Mary does in fact consume all these drinks. Things improve dramatically if I can somehow see Mary as having an intention or plan to carry out this feat. 26 Suppose someone has bet Mary a tenner that she couldn't possibly consume all these drinks, and she is in the middle of attempting it when she begins to feel sick. Then she might say afterwards:
(30) I was drinking three cups of tea and ve glasses of whisky when I started to feel sick and gave up.
In this context, the progressive sounds perfectly natural and correct. In a comment on Ogihara's paper, Caenepeel and Moens (1990) suggest that an account of the progressive needs to capture the di erence between something that can be seen as part of a plan 27 and something that can't. They take this to suggest that the semantics of the progressive cannot be captured in purely temporal terms, but they do not formalise the notion of \plan".
Can we make some progress here using channels? One way of thinking about it is to say that, in the case of a pre-planned scenario like the marking of a set of papers, we can employ a channel supporting a constraint between the type of situation where one is in the middle of such a marking task (with the intention of nishing it) and the type of situation that corresponds to completing the task|what we might call a \general marking constraint".
Similarly, if we know that Mary is attempting some drinking feat, then we can employ a channel supporting a constraint between the type of situation where one is partway through a drinking feat (with the intention of completing it) and the situation type where one completes it. If, however, the drinking was not planned but simply the result of Mary having a bad day (or, perhaps, a good party), then we cannot classify the described situation as being of the required antecedent type, and the progressive is not licensed.
Notice, once again, that Asher's notion of default does not seem to work here. A hearer may accept (29), provided he believes that Mary intends to consume all these drinks, while being very sceptical of Mary's ability to achieve her aim. Thus we have another example where it seems wrong to identify the correct use of the progressive with a license to perform default reasoning in the particular case described.
The universe
We now return to our earlier example (6) , repeated here as (31).
(31) For many billions of years, the universe was contracting back to a singularity. Then, in the last hour or so, the interactions between black holes prevented it from ever reaching that point, and it began to expand again.
which we argued posed problems for Landman's account. We now can explain why the progressive is acceptable here, by virtue of the fact that some channel supports a general \contracting constraint", which we can write as:
\X contracting back to Y" ! \X contracts back to Y" and the fact that the situation of the universe contracting back to a singularity is conceivably possible to us. Whether such an event is possible according to the laws of Physics does not appear to be relevant here. This leads to the question of what exactly is the nature of channels and constraints|do they exist independently of reasoning agents as part of the natural order of things, or are they part of the way that agents like ourselves perceive and attempt to make sense of their environment?
Perhaps in many cases we want to think of channels and constraints as somehow being part of the way things are, and in a sense existing independently of the agents that employ them for reasoning. There are some di cult philosophical questions here which we will not attempt to answer. One thing that seems clear, however, is that it is useful to be able to model the fact that one community may be \attuned" (to use Barwise and Perry's term) to constraints to which the rest of us are not. Consider, for example, a community of religious believers, who believe that when they pray, God forgives their sins. Someone from such a community, on seeing Peter at repentant prayer, could describe the situation as:
(32) Peter's sins are being forgiven.
while a sceptical outsider might question the truth of this progressive. We might say that the religious community perceives the existence of a channel supporting the constraint:
\X prays to God" ! \X's sins are forgiven"
and this is what licenses their use of the progressive.
Looking from the outside, we might say that this progressive is appropriately used to describe the situation in question, in a context where the conversational participants are attuned to the above constraint. The channel supporting the constraint re ects, as we have seen, the perspective taken by this community of believers. We are thus able to take an informational perspective which saves us from having to worry about which constraints \actually exist" independently of the agents who perceive and use them.
Of course, many questions remain about exactly how we reason with channels. The answer to some of these may have to wait for further developments in channel theory. But at least we have been able to make a start towards the precise analysis of some problematic progressives that other accounts have not been able to deal with.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have reviewed some recent accounts of the progressive and argued that they are unsatisfactory in certain respects. In attempting to decide what was going wrong, we showed how moving from a default analysis like Asher's to an account based on the notion of natural regularity, as given by channel theory, allows us to deal with some of the problems, while at the same time capturing important insights from both Asher's and Landman's approaches. In particular, we showed how the idea of channels supporting constraints of varying degrees of generality allows us to account for the problematic \mine eld" examples.
In addition, we have shown how channel theory can make precise the notion of perspective introduced informally by Landman. Our analysis has enabled us to explain a number of examples that are problematic for earlier accounts.
relation exceptional. This is clearly an interesting topic which deserves further study, and where further work on the foundations of channel theory may be required. 10 We will show below how the notion of situation type is characterised in situation theory. 11 We will consider the mine eld question below.
12 I am indebted to Jerry Seligman and Lawrence Cavedon for discussion of this point. 13 Cavedon is actually concerned with the reasoning we carry out with the information conveyed by generic sentences, but the idea is basically the same. See (Cavedon and Glasbey in press ) for an analysis of generic sentences using channel theory.
14 This is actually an abbreviated version of Smith's DRS. We have omitted some detail which spells out that imperfective viewpoint excludes endpoints, and some information about temporal reference which is not relevant here.
15 See (Glasbey 1994a ) for further discussion of Smith's analysis and an attempt to formalise her intuitions in a situation theoretic framework. 16 S, X and Y are parameters, denoted by capital letters in situation theory. 17 It is necessary to pick out such \minimal situations", as there may be many other situations of which S is a part, which also support the infon in question (for example, the situation that we might call`Mary's holiday in Scotland'). It is possible to identify such minimal situations, because in situation theory, a situation is viewed as \a part of the world as individuated by an agent". This means that it is possible for a situation S to support only the infon climb(X,Y,T) , without necessarily supporting other facts about Mary and Ben
Nevis, for example. Situations are not identi ed with (spatio)temporal locations, so there is no problem about S having to support other infons with the same time (and place) coordinates. For further discussion, see (Glasbey 1994b, Ch.3) . We agree with the anonymous referee who pointed out that we need to formalise more precisely what makes a situation a \complete event". This brings us to a consideration of how best to represent the aspectual class of situations, but space unfortunately does not permit this here. For a discussion and some proposals, see (Glasbey 1994b, Ch.5) . 18 Cooper's de nition allows a situation to have more than one key infon, but we will not worry about this complication here. See (Glasbey 1994b ) for further discussion.
19 See (Glasbey 1994b) , especially chapters 3 and 5, for further discussion of situations, infons, times, and the relations between them. 20 We ignore tense here, for simplicity. 21 It could probably be argued that our account is not so very di erent from Landman's in this respect|that the notions of \possible" and \reasonable" are not so far apart. This may well be true in general, although we have argued that Landman's account would not predict the acceptability of the mine eld example. But while recognising that there are some strong intuitive similarities between Landman's account and ours, the channel theoretic framework gives us tools to begin to make precise some notions which are left unformalised in Landman's account. 22 Note that Asher's account can deal with such examples. In his theory, the sentence content would be expressed in terms of con icting defaults, giving a \Nixon Diamond" from which no further information can be inferred.
23 Situation theory allows us to build in such requirements very naturally using the supports relation between a situation and an infon. We can simply require that s supports (a) certain infon(s) corresponding to John's intentions. 24 Clearly, the general constraint used here must be su ciently speci c to allow discrimination between cases where intention must be present, and cases where it need not. This is why we have suggested that the constraint speci es`millionaire' rather than`X makes Y a Z'. 25 It is not the case, as one referee remarked, that we remain \inconclusive" as to whether the agent's intentions should be included, but rather that intentions must be included for some event-types and not for others. Our account provides the required exibility over whether or not intentions are included in each case. 26 Ogihara suggests that progressives like these are acceptable if we can regard the eating and drinking as comprising one \coherent event". However, he does not make this notion precise. 27 Caenepeel and Moens point out that the problem of speaking of a plan is that it has connotations of intentionality, which are not always desirable.
